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1) Introduction: Improvisation and the Politics of Technology
One of the four contributors to the 2007 Goldsmiths conference on Speculative Realism,1 Ray 
Brassier occupies an important place among a diverse group of thinkers who have argued for 
realist alternatives to philosophies of subjectivity, finitude and deconstruction that had been core 
to post-Kantian continental philosophy for some years. Some of these new realisms have sought 
to combat the reflex anti-scientism of the established traditions. Brassier’s book Nihil Unbound 
(2007) argues that nihilism—the modern crisis of meaning—is an emancipatory consequence of 
scientific reason; one which can inform a transcendental realism predicated on the ultimate cosmic 
extinction of nature. Brassier’s later work engages more closely with analytical variants of 
Kantianism—particularly via readings of the work of Wilfred Sellars—aiming to develop a 
naturalism that reconciles materialism with a commitment to truth, conceptual normativity and 
abstraction.  
Brassier has also engaged with radical art practice as a way of developing a materialist account of 
agency that embraces the artificialization of mind and nature as a form of political praxis. His 
“Unfree Improvisation/Compulsive Freedom” (written for the 2013 collaboration with Basque noise 
artist Mattin at Glasgow’s Tramway) is a dense but rich example of this side of his work. It is a terse 
but, I hope to show, fertile discussion of freedom in improvisation and its relation to technological 
futurity. Here, by relinquishing some of the rationalist constraints on agency imposed by Brassier’s 
analytic Kantianism, I intend to use it as a platform for developing a Speculative Posthumanist 
ontology of performance.   
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“Unfree Improvisation” begins with a polemic against the voluntarist conception of freedom. The 
voluntarist understands free action as the uncaused expression of a ‘sovereign self’. Brassier 
rejects this supernaturalist understanding of freedom, arguing that we should view freedom not 
as the determination of an act from outside the causal order, but as the self-determination by action 
within the causal order. According to Brassier, self-determination is reflexive and rule-governed. A 
self-determining system acts in conformity to rules but can represent and modify these rules with 
implications for its future behaviour.  
This is only possible—according to Brassier—if we make the rules explicit through language 
(Brassier 2013b, 105; Sellars 1954, 226). Brassier’s proximate inspiration for this model of freedom 
is Sellars’ account of language and meaning (1954). Sellars reinterprets Kant’s claim that concepts 
are rules for unifying experience as a functional semantics, framed in terms of the role of 
utterances within social practices that prescribe how speakers move from one position in a 
language-game to another (transition rules), assume an ‘initial position’ (entry rules), or exit the 
game (outputting actions). 
Language-transition rules correspond to materially correct inferences such as the inference that x 
is coloured from x is red. Language-entry rules are non-inferential since they are made on the basis 
of reliable dispositions to discriminate the world in inferentially or practically consequential ways 
(Sellars 1954, 209–10). As Robert Brandom puts it, statements like ‘This is red’ (uttered in response 
to red things) are ‘noninferentially elicited but inferentially articulated’ (Brandom 1994, 235, 258).  
Sellars distinguishes an automatic and unconscious rule following from a metalinguistic level that 
affords logical resources for reflection and self-awareness. Indeed, for Brassier’s Sellars, thought 
and intentional action derive from the metalinguistic power to make reasons explicit in ‘talk about 
talk’ and not from a phenomenological or prelinguistic intentionality (Brassier 2013b, 105; Sellars 
1954, 226–8).2 Since talk and meta-talk are furnished by such inferential norms, intentional action 
is likewise constituted. To be free is to be an animal capable of following such shared proprieties. 
Far from being the expression of a sovereign self acting beyond the causal order, freedom is 
subservience to collective reasons: ‘Autonomy understood as a self-determining act is the 
destitution of selfhood and the subjectivation of the rule. The “oneself” that subjects itself to the 
rule is the anonymous agent of the act’ (Brassier 2013a). 
Since Brassier is also an avowed naturalist, it is important, for him, that this capacity for rule 
following is non-miraculous; that a material assemblage of pattern-governed mechanisms can be 
‘gripped by concepts’ (Brassier 2011). As he continues:  
The act […] remains faceless. But it can only be triggered under very specific 
circumstances. Acknowledgement of the rule generates the condition for deviating 
from or failing to act in accordance with the rule that constitutes subjectivity. This 
acknowledgement is triggered by the relevant recognitional mechanism; it requires 
no appeal to the awareness of a conscious self. (Brassier 2013a) 
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Now, there are a few criticisms that one can make of this account. For example, Brassier struggles 
to articulate the relationship between linguistic rules or norms and the natural regularities and 
behaviours on which they depend. For this reason, I’ve argued that the normative functionalism 
associated with Sellars and, latterly, Robert Brandom bottoms out in Davidson-style claims about 
how idealized interpreters (privy to the relevant facts) might construe a given stretch of behaviour 
(See Roden 2017). Brassier’s position arguably depends, then, on the conception of an interpreting 
subject it is not in a position to satisfactorily explain. Despite its pretensions to naturalistic virtue, 
his universe bifurcates between a non-normative material reality and an order of thought that 
depends on it without really belonging to it.  
These metaphysical issues lurk in the background in Brassier’s short text on improvisation—
particularly in the claim that the act of improvisation involves an encounter between rule governed 
reason and pattern governed mechanisms. Brassier does not specify how such rules operate in 
music, or how the encounter between rules and mechanism can occur. 
In what follows, I will argue that one reason he does not do this is that such rules do not constrain 
improvisation or contemporary (musical) compositional practice. Claims about what is permissible 
or implied in music index context-sensitive perceptual responses to musical events. These 
responses exhibit tensions between the expectations sedimented in musical culture and actual 
musical events or acts. 
However, I will argue that this account of musical succession provides an alternate way of 
expressing Brassier’s remarks on the relationship between music and history in ‘Unfree 
Improvisation’—one that eschews normative discourse in favour of describing the processes, 
capacities and potentialities operating in the improvising situation. 
This adjustment is of interest outside musical aesthetics and ontology, however, because Brassier’s 
text suggests that the temporality of the improvising act is a model for understanding a wider 
relationship with time: in particular the remorseless temporality explored in his writings on 
Prometheanism, Accelerationist Marxism and Radical Enlightenment (see Brassier 2014). Given 
that improvisation involves a kind of autonomy and, pace Brassier, is not rule governed or 
constituted by rules, I hope to show that it exemplifies a posthuman conception of freedom that 
abstracts from the collective notions of subjectivity valorized by his neo-rationalism. It thus 
suggests a model for understanding how agents (human or otherwise) can respond fluently to the 
radically open horizons of being I discuss in Posthuman Life (Roden 2014). 
This paper can, then, be thought of as a staged encounter between the conceptions of agency 
presupposed in Prometheanism and my own Speculative Posthumanism.  
Brassier’s Prometheanism, like Reza Negarestani’s ‘inhumanism’, proposes that all reasons are 
‘artificial’: implicit or explicit moves within language games (Negarestani 2014a/b. See Bakker 
2014b for a trenchant critique). Consequently, the Promethean rejects all quasi-theological limits 
on artificialisation and enjoins the wholesale ‘reengineering of ourselves and our world on a more 
rational basis’ (2014, 487).  
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Speculative Posthumanism (SP) does not propose any theological limits to artificialisation. Far from 
it! However, it holds that the space of possible agents is not bound (a priori) by conditions of human 
agency, including the collective principles of articulation discussed above. Since we lack future-
proof knowledge of possible agents based on the transcendental conditions for human agency, I 
refer to such a posthumanism as ‘anthropologically unbounded’. Unbounded posthumanism 
allows that the results of techno-political interventions could be weird in ways that we are not 
currently able to imagine (Roden 2014; 2018).  
For Brassier, the sliver of humanism worth salvaging is a subtractive version of what Sellars calls 
‘the manifest image’—the conceptual framework in which we understand ourselves as reflective 
subjects responsive to and evaluable within the ‘space of reasons’ (Sellars 1962). Brassier argues 
that the idea of man as ‘self-conscious rational agent’ is central to any conception of cognition as a 
‘self-correcting exercise’; even the explanatory project of replacing the naïve manifest image of 
persons and things with the rectified concepts of a successor science—e.g. junking 
phenomenology in favour of some cognitivist account of consciousness (Brassier 2011). 
In contrast, for Unbounded Posthumanism there is no a priori structure constitutive of subjectivity 
or agency. Thus, the speculative posthumanist cannot appeal to an idea of rational subjectivity to 
support an ethics of posthuman becoming.  
So, what might autonomy or freedom involve from the purview of unbounded posthumanism—
or, in a more speculative mode, what takes the place of the normative conception avowed by 
Brassier and others? What, if anything, counts as emancipatory as opposed to oppressive violence? 
I will argue that the idea of freedom embedded in Brassier’s text on improvisation can be 
elucidated and developed within SP by comparing the mechanistic genesis of improvisation to the 
predicament of agents in rapidly changing technical systems. Thus, Brassier’s treatment of 
improvisation retains its wider resonance on this posthumanist reading, though without its 
normative integument. 
2. Harmonic Structure and Succession 
I will begin by making use of some analyses of performance practices in post-war jazz and Julian 
Johnson’s analysis of the disruption of the rhetoric of harmonic accompaniment in the work of 
Anton Webern to support this model of affective subjectivity in improvisation. I aim to show that 
show that our understanding of harmonic tendencies and melodic succession involves highly 
contextual expectation and sensations rather than the grasp of norms of harmonic or melodic 
succession. In the next section I will consider how this ‘affective’ model can be incorporated into 
an account of posthuman agency. 
Novice jazz improvisers must internalize a large body of musical theory: e.g., they learn modal 
variations on the Ionian and harmonic minor scale or ‘rules’ for chord substitution in cadences 
based on shared tritones. This learning enables musical performance by sculpting possibilities for 
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action during improvisation. For example, ambiguous voicings involving tritones or fourths 
decouple chords from a harmonic root, allowing modulations into what otherwise might be distant 
keys to slide easily over a loose tonal center. 
This harmonic know-how consists of recipes for honing expectations and sensations, not the 
acknowledgement of norms. The statement that a tritone (augmented fourth) belonging to a 
dominant seventh chord should resolve to a tonic reflects listener expectations in diatonic 
environments where a tonal center is defined in practice. This is not an intrinsic feature of the 
tritone, though, since each tritone occurs in two dominant chords. For example, the B-F tritone 
occurs in both G7 (resolving to C) and Dflat7. This provides a recipe for substituting a dominant 
chord at a tritone remove in perfect cadences. 
However, it also allows harmonic series to modulate into unrelated keys. As jazz theorist Martin 
Rosenberg notes, the use of augmented dominants with two tritones by Bebop players such as 
Charlie Parker and Thelonious Monk produce multiple lines of harmonic consequence and thus an 
ambiguous context that is not conventionally diatonic, even if (in contrast to free jazz) some 
adherence to a tonal center is preserved (Rosenberg 2010). 
Symmetrical chords built of fourths (as used by pianists such as McCoy Tyner and Bill Evans) or 
major thirds have a similar effect, whether in diatonic contexts (where, as ‘rootless voicings’, they 
can render the tonic ambiguous by stripping it to the 3rd, sixth and ninth) or in modal contexts 
where a tonal center is still implied by a pedal bass (239).  
Similarly, an alternative model system constructed not from the Ionian mode (conventional major 
scale) but from the melodic minor scale has allowed jazz musicians to explore more harmonically 
ambiguous melodic complements to conventional chords. The seventh degree of the major scale 
(Locrian) is already a ‘dark’ harmonically ambiguous scale which contains a minor second scale step 
and a flattened fifth instead of the more consonant fifth (and is often altered minor chords). 
However, a Locrian mode built on the melodic scale (sometimes known as the ‘super-locrian’) 
provides four altered notes with respect to the home key, thus complementing the elasticity of 
tonal center established by symmetrical or rootless chord voicings (206). 
In consequence, the home key in the modal jazz developed by Miles Davis and John Coltrane never 
prescribes a series of actions but furnishes expectations that can make an improvisation 
aesthetically intelligible after the fact. As Rosenberg explains, when Coltrane improvises in modal 
compositions such as ‘A Love Supreme’ he deploys pentatonic or digital patterns modulated far 
from the tonal center implied by the ‘head’ (the tune that traditionally opens or closes a jazz 
improvisation) and its associated harmonic context: 
During his solos, Coltrane performs constant modulations through a series of 
harmonic targets or, what avant-garde architects Arakawa and Gins would call 
tentative ‘landing sites’ (2002: 10) that become deployed sonically over a simple 
harmonic ‘home’ through the use of centered and then increasingly distant 
pentatonic scales from that home. In doing so, Coltrane seeks to widen what I call 
‘the bandwidth’ of melodic, harmonic and rhythmic relationships possible. He does 
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so as he maintains the coherence of the melodic line (or narrative) through the 
aurally comfortable shapes (from the perspective of the audience especially) 
enabled by those very pentatonic scales, despite the juxtaposition of distant and 
dissonant tonal centers implied by this method. (211–12) 
This differential/transformative structure is, perhaps unsurprisingly, characteristic of modernist 
Western scored music in the classical tradition. In his analysis of Anton Webern’s Three Little Pieces 
for Piano and Cello, Op 11, Julian Johnson argues that the opening two bars of the first piece allude 
to the framing and introduction of melody in traditional song and opera. For example, in baroque 
recitative the onset of a lyrical melody is frequently indicated by an arpeggiated chord. However, 
the high register chord that occurs in the first bar of the piece follows a single muted cello note 
and is followed, in turn, by a descending piano passage, bathetically marking the absence of the 
expressive melody portended by the chord (Johnson 1998, 277, 272). 
Culturally transmitted musical structures consist of context-sensitive patterns of expectation—like 
the chord/recitative framing relation discussed by Johnson. These exist in tension with the musical 
act and are transformed in exemplary works. Indeed, As David Huron argues, compositional 
‘prescriptions’ such as Palestrina’s explicitly articulated rule that a melodic leap should be 
compensated for by compensating scale step are routinely honored in the breach:  
For hundreds of years musicians have been taught that it is good to resolve a large 
leap with a step in the other direction [post-skip reversal]. Surely at least some 
composers followed this advice? The statistical results from von Hippel and Huron 
imply that for each passage where a composer had intentionally written according 
to post-skip reversal, then they must have intentionally transgressed this principle 
in an equivalent number of passages. Otherwise the statistics would not work out. 
(Huron 2006, 84)  
Huron’s cross-cultural analysis shows that actual musical practice is consistent with a regression 
to the mean pattern, whereby melodies tend naturally to cluster around the median of the pitch 
range (tessitura) of the melody. Thus, leaps tend to be followed by compensating up or down 
movements where they land at the extremes of the tessitura, but not where they land near the 
median pitch.   
However, the post-skip reversal heuristic is, it seems, applied by listeners. The statistics suggest that 
applying this heuristic will lead to the correct result 70 percent of the time. It is thus ‘good enough’ 
and less exacting than applying regression to the mean, since it does not require the listener to 
infer the tessitura from the melody (85). 
It seems that linguistic formulations of musical norms, such as Palestrina’s, do not prescribe but 
indirectly describe how musical transitions are modelled and predicted by acculturated listeners—
(a thesis that is suggestive in the light of the predictive coding model of mind and agency I will 
outline in the next section).  
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When internalized, such procedures offer affordances for manipulating musical material. For 
example, most novice jazz musicians practice improvising over classical perfect cadences resolving 
from the second (minor) chord of the major scale to the tonic by way of the dominant seventh 
(often known as a II-V7-I cadence). This develops a facility for moving through the changes of many 
standard melodies. However, as Rosenberg reminds us, learning this formula does not prevent 
one engaging in substitutions that violate such expectations, thereby producing a more 
harmonically ambiguous environment (e.g., substituting a major seventh chord for a semitone 
above the tonic—such as, Gminor7, C7, F#Major 7). Indeed, facility with authorized transitions 
makes it easier to apply these substitutions on the fly. 
In the context of improvisation and composition, we are not free in virtue of acknowledging or 
declining musical norms since these have never been in place other than as loose expectations or 
recipes. Brassier’s neo-rationalist concept of autonomy, then, seems ill adapted to musical 
contexts, even if we buy into his naturalist dismissal of any sovereign self. If we are to tease out 
the implications of his text for posthuman agency, we need to formulate an alternative account of 
autonomy in improvisational contexts that is not predicated on the acknowledgement of musical 
norms. 
3. The Alien Time of Improvisation 
An improvisation takes place in a time window limited by the memory and attention of the 
improviser, responding to her own playing, to the other players, or (as Brassier recognizes) to the 
real-time behaviour of machines such as audio processors or midi-filters. It thus consists of 
irreversible acts that cannot be compositionally refined. They can only be repeated, developed or 
overwritten by subsequent acts.  
Improvisation is thus committed to what Andy Hamilton calls ‘an aesthetics of imperfection’ as 
opposed to a Platonism for which the musical work is only contingently associated with 
performance (Hamilton 2000, 172). The aesthetics of imperfection celebrates the genesis of a 
performance itself, its embodiment in a specific time and space.3  
If improvisation is a genesis, it implies an irreversible temporality. Composition or digital editing is 
always reversible. One develops notational variants of an idea before winnowing them down or 
rejecting them. One hits Ctl/Cmd + Z in the DAW (Digital Audio Workstation) when a mix goes bad.  
An improvisation, by contrast, is always a unique and irreversible event on the cusp of another. An 
omniscient being would be incapable of improvising because its options would be given in 
advance. Unlike the improviser, it could never surprise itself. Its act would be represented before 
it took place and thus reversible.  
It follows that an improvisation must exceed the improviser’s power of representation in principle. The 
improvising agent must operate with things or processes that s/he/it cannot fully control or know, 
including her own mental or body systems. Paraphrasing Amy Ireland’s discussion of H. P. 
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Lovecraft and Michel Serres, improvisation necessitates an alien interloper which constantly 
threatens to disrupt or divert familiar relationships and forms of succession.  
This interloper can be understood as a kind of noise or interference that results from the human 
subject’s inability to master or understand itself as a material system, a natural thing. In French, 
parasite can mean both an organism that lives off its host or interference, static. Serres’ book The 
Parasite utilizes this homonymy to explore the necessity with which the interference or chance 
deviation generates reality by interrupting any rational system or ordering: for example the 
allocation of living creatures into host and parasite, user and used (Ireland 2016, 220; Serres 2007, 
10, 19).  
For Ireland, likewise, identifying the noise—the parasite—is never an innocent operation. It requires 
that we adopt a perspective on the relationship between an experiencing subject and the 
unexperienced ‘real’ which constitutes experience (see also Thompson 2012).  
Viewed from the perspective of the Subject, that impersonal, asubjective real is the parasite: the 
unexperienced ‘outside’ that constitutes noise, since it is not ordered according to reason or 
reasonableness. In terms of the retelling of La Fontaine’s tale of the country rat who shares a meal 
with the city rat, with which Serres begins his work, this noise is signified by the rats whose feasting 
disturbs the Master sleeping in his townhouse. However, the perspective can be reversed by 
treating the imposition of rational orders or relationships as a distortion of this fundamentally 
ambivalent process (Ireland 2016, 221). Thus the Master is a parasite insofar as he interrupts the 
rats feasting on the remnants of his ortolans: 
Who, then, made the noise? The rats, of course. A feast makes noise. Here are the 
guests, with their little paws; it seems like thunder above the ceiling. Here are the 
gnashing of their teeth and the scratching of the rodents. All that wakes him up. 
The noise, then, was called for by noise. (Serres 2007, 66)  
By smoothing experience with the imposition of rule governed rationality the human subject 
constitutes a meaningful world affording manipulation and social interaction: Sellars’ manifest 
image. Yet this subsists within a fundamentally arational nature which does not answer to any 
normativity. At a cosmic level, it is this Outside that must be repressed in Lovecraft’s Cthulhu 
mythos stories (Ireland 2016, 222) in order to preserve this ‘placid island of ignorance in the midst 
of black seas of infinity’. Yet from the notional position of reality, the manifest image constitutes a 
distortion of what Ireland, following Nick Land, takes to be the inhuman, ‘uninhibited “primary 
synthesis”‘—that is, the real source and being of Being (224).  
What appears (for the human subject) as an addressable human world—the manifest image of 
persons, values and objects—cuts out the intricate web of the sub-personal or impersonal 
processes that bring it into being. (For a gloss of this sub-phenomenological domain drawn from 
current cognitive science, see below.)  
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Brassier veers towards this quasi-eliminative realism at times. It is implied by his naturalistic 
proposal for explaining the evolution of reasons in terms of the organization of pattern governed 
physical systems. The freedom of improvisation requires, as he puts it, ‘an involution of [or 
reciprocal interaction between] mechanisms’ to compose the (‘not necessarily human’) agent of 
the act: 
The ideal of ‘free improvisation’ is paradoxical: in order for improvisation to be free 
in the requisite sense, it must be a self-determining act, but this requires the 
involution of a series of mechanisms. It is this involutive process that is the agent of 
the act—one that is not necessarily human. It should not be confused for the 
improviser’s self, which is rather the greatest obstacle to the emergence of the act. 
The improviser must be prepared to act as an agent—in the sense in which one 
acts as a covert operative—on behalf of whatever mechanisms can effect the 
acceleration or confrontation required for releasing the act. (n.p. My emphasis) 
The claim that there is a potential act needing to be ‘released’ in a given musical setting might seem 
to impute rule-like normativity to the improvising situation: something that ought to be. However, 
this claim does not cohere with context-sensitivity and underdetermination of expectation 
described in the previous section or with Brassier’s realist metaphysics, which assumes only a 
material reality outside of any subjective givenness or life (see Brassier 2007).  
The super-context-sensitivity of harmonic implication implies that the significance of an event for 
the unfolding of an improvisation is not normatively prescribed and, indeed, not given as such. By 
way of an illustration, Walton et al. cite an anecdote related by the jazz keyboardist Herbie Hancock 
about his early work with Miles Davis. During one performance he claims to have been certain that 
he had played a wrong note, until Davis’ deft response made it feel right—exemplifying Brian Eno’s 
oblique strategy ‘to honor your mistake as a hidden intention’ (Walton et al. 2018, 98). 
It could be objected here that such ‘feelings of rightness’ track normative truths: in this instance, 
one stipulating that the note in question is a token of some normatively sanctioned type. However, 
this conflates the claim that the note had a perceived musical value with the claim that it 
instantiated a rule of succession to which Hancock assented after Davis response. Firstly, this is 
psychologically implausible. Given that the note felt wrong before the response, Hancock could not 
have already internalized this norm. Had he done so, he would have heard the note as requiring 
the sanctioned response, not as wrong. But the rule could not have been derived from Davis 
response since we have dismissed the assumption that this instantiated a general type with which 
Hancock was acquainted. Learning a rule requires training and repetition, whereas Davis response 
was novel and unexpected.     
We can say, then, that there is a perception of aesthetic value here, but all that is registered, in 
effect, is that the players affirmed an event. If there is any tacit normative judgement, it hides in 
the background presupposition on the part of the players that their affective responses were 
reliable (see Döring 2014, 134).        
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Both the pattern generators and the events they produce are radically asemic; issuing potentialities 
for action and evaluative affects without prescriptive content (Thompson 2012, 19). Improvisatory 
events—as in Coltrane’s decentered pentatonics—do not legislate the scope for musical gesture 
by engendering new norms but, rather, offer material with which Brassier’s ‘covert operatives’ 
overwrite our values and expectations and produce new models of agency.  
These generative systems are phenomenologically unavailable, though realized and produced in 
the social and material assemblages composing the human world—e.g., pattern-recognizers and 
pattern-generators embodied and enacted by musicians skilled in finessing the affordances 
(opportunities for action) of instruments and the events they produce. They are also potentiated 
in technological artifacts (midi processors, digital and analogue effects, granular synths, tools for 
spectrum analysis or resynthesis using the fast Fourier transform, etc.).  
So, if not normatively constituted, what is the nature of the paradoxically ‘selfless’ freedom 
compelled by these noumenal interactions? If we exorcise all specters of transcendental thought—
Brassier’s normative functionalism included—how do we conceptualize ‘the subjectivity of the act’ 
or its ‘self-determination’?  
I think clues about this selfless self-determination can be gleaned from improvising situations we 
know about. The real of the improvising situation might have the medusa-headed productivity of 
Ireland’s primary process, but skilled agents have techniques for co-opting it using the available 
world of social and instrumental affordances (Debruille et al. 2012, 1).  
For example, in a field study of post-hardcore rock musicians, Alec McGuiness provides a vivid 
example of musicians using a procedural learning technique to prime a series of musical riffs over 
which their intentional control is relatively limited. Songs are built by associating riffs with riffs, but, 
as one informant explains, are varied in performance when it ‘feels right’ to do so: 
[S]ometimes there’ll be moments when we’re not looking at each other but all four 
will either hit that heavy thing, or really bring it down [...] And yeah, those moments 
[...] it’s priceless, when everyone just hits the same thing at the same time. [...] That’s 
when you know that that song’s definitely going to work. ‘Cause it’s obviously sort 
of pressing the same buttons on each of us at the same time. (McGuiness 2009, 
19) 
So, as with Davis’ overwriting of Hancock’s ‘bum’ note, releasing the act can involve a distributed 
affective response to a ‘felicitous performance’ expressed via the collective performance act itself 
rather than by application of formal musical rules of which, in the post-hard-core case at least, the 
performers are avowedly innocent.  
The phenomenology of this act is also dark. All experience is, I have argued elsewhere, striated with 
‘darkness’ (Roden 2013; Roden 2014, 82–104). Having it affords only a partial insight into its nature.  
Indeed, as Scott Bakker writes, my metaphor understates our abjection and its contribution to the 
reflex anti-naturalism of much post-Kantian thought: 
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Darkness actually provides information regarding the absence of information, and 
we had no such luxury as a child or as a species. We lacked access to any 
information tracking the lack of information: the ‘darkness’ we had to overcome, in 
other words, was the darkness of neglect. Small wonder our ignorance has felt so 
enlightened at every turn! (Bakker 2014) 
Experience seems like a gift through which we engage the world ‘transparently’— without a 
mediating representation or complex cognitive process—because we are almost entirely 
unmindful of the heavy lifting required to produce it. Under quotidian conditions, we are in the 
dark about the dark. Techniques like chaining riffs or applying the post-skip reversal heuristic 
nonetheless allow us to produce and navigate sonic events in the teeth of this metacognitive 
neglect—in Brassier words, to do ‘something with time’ even as time ‘does something with us’ 
(2014, 469).  
This conception of improvisation as the entraining of phenomenologically obscure ‘operatives’ or 
‘noumenal engines’ coheres with the theoretically fertile Predictive Coding (PC) account of 
neurocomputation in contemporary cognitive science.  
In what follows, I will present a brief overview of the PC approach. My goal here is speculative 
rather than explanatory: not to suggest that PC is an unassailable or final account of cognition or 
agency (though it is compelling and rich) but to hint at the functional complexity cooking the 
improvisor’s manifest image. Additionally, an account predicated on the idea that brains are 
prediction machines will help us to foreground the insurgently ‘unpredictable’ and open character 
of improvisation and its pertinence to a posthuman conception of agency. 
PC understands perception and action as hierarchically ordered cycles of prediction-error 
minimization operating at multiple temporal scales and levels of processing throughout animal 
nervous systems. The predictions are made by generative models (neural networks) in the form of 
modulatory feedback that gets compared to bottom up ‘driving signals’ from ‘input’ layers lower in 
the processing hierarchy. Where the model fails to predict the driving signal its hypothesis is 
updated until it issues predictions that match the driving signal, thereby retuning the model to 
govern the agent’s perceptual transactions more fluently.  
From the purview of Bayesian epistemology, this updating process is weighted both on the 
‘likelihood’—how well a hypothesis predicts the evidence (input)—and the ‘priors’ encoding 
background expectations which exert their influence from further up in the hierarchy (Feldman 
2013, 18). In effect each prior functions as a conditional likelihood in respect of models further up 
the hierarchy. 
Some top-down predictions may code relatively abstract properties of the world in terms of the 
prior probabilities of coincident features in the environment of the agent, such as that changes in 
objects are typically caused by changes in other objects. As Andy Clark observes in his surveys of 
the predictive coding literature, these abstract ‘hyperpriors’ have organizing features analogous to 
Kantian transcendental synthesis (Clark 2013, 196, Section 3.3; Clark 2015, 174–5). However, if it 
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makes sense to talk of ‘synthesis’ here, it is better seen as the fluent control of agency and self-
maintenance than as a conceptual operation whereby a sensory manifold is united under a 
concept.  
One of the most fascinating aspects of the PC account is the way it complicates our folk distinction 
between perception, inference and intention or will. From this perspective, intention and perception 
share the same satisfaction conditions. In the PC model, actions are predictions embodied as motor 
patterns at sub-cortical levels.4 In action cycles, error reduction will involve the realization of more 
abstract ‘goals’ through the minimization of proprioceptive errors; thereby moving the organism 
into a predicted configuration (Clark 2015, 131; Adams, Shipp & Friston 2013).5 
Thus, when an improvising pianist explores—say—possibilities for sharing rhythmic or melodic 
lines between hands, she is augmenting her freedom (or functional autonomy—see below) by 
sculpting ‘dark’ generative mechanisms. These are not intuitable aspects of her phenomenological 
world; though, as per Ireland’s discussion of the primary process, they are generative conditions 
for it (Roden 2013, 172–4).  
Only their output is phenomenologically available and, as per the PC account, even these 
embodied processes are subject to the suppression of sensory awareness of the consequences of 
fluent action. This is explained under the PC model because active inference can only operate if 
the ‘gain’ on prediction error from sensory input is attenuated, according functional primacy to the 
motor system for the reduction of error (Clark 2015, 213–217). J. Limanowski suggests this may 
explain the standard phenomenological distinction between the lived and objective body.6  
When things ‘click’ in a group improvisation, we feel an affective state or groove that seems 
shared—’pressing the same buttons in each of us’—perhaps because such states are 
multifunctional elements which can also be used to perceive others’ affective states (see 
Limanowski 2017, 6).  
Such shared states seem to be fundamentally affective, rather than essentially involving beliefs 
about others’ mental states which mediate folk theoretical inferences about the group’s 
propensities for action. Firstly, these affects are not paradigmatic emotions evoking stereotypic 
expressions or feelings—e.g., fear and fight and flight—but transient potentials modulating action; 
inflexions in a singular process. Even if it were possible for the subject to intellectually ascribe such 
subtle influences to some individual or collective, their singularity and transience means their 
influence is entirely non-inferential. Thus, their influence on performance is plausibly due to their 
capacity to modulate the action-readiness of the performers, as constrained by the affordances of 
instruments and learned musical idioms (Gallagher and Allen 2018; Debruille et al. 2012). Such 
affects are not ‘had’ or ‘owned’, as emotions are, but produce changes at the interstices of bodies 
and assemblages (Thompson 2012, 20). 
Secondly, these affects issue in complex dynamical patterns in which spontaneous islands of 
coherence or ‘mirroring’ may occur, but also considerable divergence. Walton et al. describe 
statistical analyses of patterns of coherence between bodily (forearm and head) movements and 
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playing behaviour of pianists improvising jointly against ostinato patterns, swing backing and 
drones. For example, the analysis of the right forearm movements over the ostinato pattern, with 
the two pianists improvising together freely, displays regularly spaced pockets of coordination at 
multiple temporal scales within the duration over which the ostinato was repeated. This contrasts 
with the far more homogenous stretches of coherence when the pianists were asked to play in 
unison, but also with far the patchier dynamics that occurred against the drone (Walton et al. 2015, 
5). Finally, they also uncovered surprising multiscale coordination between up and down head 
movements against a swing track, suggesting that the interaction of performers extends beyond 
explicit musical gesture to expressive bodily movements that do not enact specific intentions, 
rendering them inaccessible from a folk-theoretical perspective (6). 
The preceding examples also indicate that the generative mechanisms or models entrained in 
improvisation are not primarily predictive but differentially productive, spinning out novel sonic and 
bodily events. This is compatible with the PC account if it is construed less in 
internalist/representationalist terms but as a mechanism for implementing fluent embodied 
behaviour. As Clark (2015) and Feldman (2013) point out, the mechanisms posited by PC do not 
operate in a stable, changeless environment that could be characterized by a single true ‘prior’ (the 
‘Lord’s Prior’—see Feldman 2013) but a profligate, alterable reality.7 Models that overfit data sets 
over a time-slice from a mutable environment may be prone to ‘overtuning’ to agent-irrelevant 
noise and less adaptable to future events.  
This suggests that the capacity for spontaneously variable behaviour found in improvisors may 
reflect tactics for exploring novel forms of stable behaviour in highly changeable environments. 
This speculation is supported by experimental work in robotics that suggests that hierarchically 
organized neural networks that exhibit chaotic behaviour at larger timescales—corresponding, 
perhaps, to the modulatory influence of higher cortical regions on action—are more effective in 
selecting appropriate action repertoires. Clark suggests that this modulus may enact hyperpriors 
treating the world as intrinsically changeable and unstable (see Clark 2015, 274; Namikawa et al. 
2011). In terms of Ireland’s speculative aesthetics, one could say that the profligate noumenal 
reality that the subject smooths into a human manifest image is necessarily involved in its own 
sub-personal, sub-phenomenal smoothing. In short: it’s rats all the way down.   
I think we can understand how such a capacity for endogenous variation might constitute 
posthuman freedom better by utilizing a conception of autonomy that is not exclusive to discursive 
creatures (as is the case with Brassier’s conception of self-determination).  
In Posthuman Life, I refer to this as ‘functional autonomy’ (Roden 2014, 124–149). This idea helps 
articulate an unbounded speculative posthumanism because it applies to any self-maintaining 
system capable of enlisting values for its functionings or of becoming a value for some wider 
assemblage. A functionally autonomous system might be discursive and social; it might be a 
superintelligent but asocial singleton that only wants to produce paperclips. It might be something 
whose existence is utterly inconceivable to us, like a computational megastructure leeching the 
energy output of an entire star. 
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A diminution of functional autonomy is a reduction in power. Arthritis of the limbs painfully 
reduces freedom of movement and thus the ability to cultivate agency in other ways. Acquiring 
new skills increases ‘one’s capacities to affect and be affected, or to put it differently, increase one’s 
capacities to enter into novel assemblages’ (DeLanda 2006, 50; Roden 2014, 190).  
To be sure, success at improvising is not like acquiring a new skill. However, it requires that the 
agent embraces and is embraced by a reality and time that interrupts any settled structure of 
values and ends.  
This embrace might seem atavistic, divorced from the Promethean prospectus for engineering 
nature in compliance to reason. But this assumes that the means for engineering nature are 
themselves compliant, rather than factors which ramp up the unpredictability and uncontrollability 
of the real. Far from being socially constituted or constructed, technical systems are inputs to the 
primary process; ‘covertly operating’, gnawing the dark beyond the manifest image. Thus, I argue 
in Posthuman Life, the systemic complexity of modern technique precludes binding technologies to 
norms in the long run. Modern self-augmenting technical systems are so complex as to be both out 
of control and characterized by massive functional indeterminacy—rendering them independent 
of any social prescription or political order we may care to erect around them (Roden 2014, 150–
165; Roden 2016).  
As the world is re-made by this vast planetary substance, any agent located in the system needs to 
preserve its ability to acquire new ends and purposes or pay the price of overfitting in unstable 
environments. Any technology liable to increase our ability to accrue new values and couplings in 
anomalous environments, then, is of local ecological value (Roden 2014, 191).8 This is not because 
such technologies make agents better or happier—as a non-anthropocentric account, 
posthumanism has no metric for welfare or flourishing—but preserves them as agents, though 
not, perhaps, as human.  
In this ‘posthuman predicament’, agency must be febrile, even masochistic (see Bersani 1986). The 
agent must tolerate and practice a systemic violence against itself and its world; against stable 
values or identities; performing its intrasubjective equivalent of the deracinative (extra-subjective) 
noise of modernity’s technological and planetary networks.  
Conclusions 
Improvisation— because it experiments with the ‘involuted’ mechanisms of the performers body 
and environment—rehearses our seemingly inescapable tryst with the ontological violence of the 
hypermodern. It thus provides an exemplar of an agential freedom in late modernity. There can 
be no posthuman aesthetics (any more than there can be a posthuman ethics) because unbinding 
relinquishes the position from which the aesthetic could grasped as a generalizable structure. 
However, this process is structurally aesthetic insofar as its nature is formed by iterative 
experimentation with the limits of what bodies can be or do. Posthuman freedom consists in the 
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capacity to map and generates the unbounded through ceaseless experimentation with the 
noumenal sources of agency. 
The implications of such agency are paradoxical. Unbound Posthumanism, I argued, places no 
limits on what an agent or a subject or thought could be. Epistemologically, this can be supported 
using ‘dark phenomenology’ arguments to sustain anti-transcendentalist positions (see Bakker 
2014b; Roden 2013). However, its implications are post- or even non-philosophical, for, as I argue 
elsewhere, it forces us to relinquish any constraints on the very idea of agency or thought itself 
(see Roden 2018). It refuses a position from which to constrain this ‘unbounded’, which remains 




1 The others being Quentin Meillassoux, Iain Hamilton Grant and Graham Harman. 
2 As an example of such a metalinguistic resource, Robert Brandom cites the conditional (if… then…) statement as 
‘the paradigm of a locution that permits one to make inferential commitments explicit as the content of 
judgements’ (Brandom 1994, 109). 
3 “Improvisation makes the performer alive in the moment; it brings one to a state of alertness, even what Ian Carr 
in his biography of Keith Jarrett has called the ‘state of grace’. This state is enhanced in a group situation of 
interactive empathy. But all players, except those in a large orchestra, have choices inviting spontaneity at the 
point of performance. These begin with the room in which they are playing, its humidity and temperature, who 
they are playing with, and so on” (Hamilton 2000,183). 
4 Reducing prediction error by changing specific body trajectories or relative positions of body parts. 
5 Thus, constraining the improbability (or more accurately the self-information or ‘surprisal’) of an environment 
relative to a probability distribution of environments corresponding to the nature of an encoding agent (See 
Hohwy 2013, 51–58). 
6  To do so, he appeals to Thomas Metzinger’s claim that our phenomenology is generated by a dynamic 
phenomenal self model (PSM) representing the modeler as a distinct and always present (‘untranscendable’) part 
of its world (Limanowski 2017, 10). The phenomenal world model thus includes a phenomenal self-model but 
neither sub-model represents the processes that implement them—for example error reduction processes or 
the transient attenuations of input for reallocation of attention or functional role.  
7  Jacob Feldman argues that the intuitive way of interpreting the idea of a single true prior—’The Lord’s Prior’ is 
frequentist: the single true prior would reflect the objective frequency of events. Such that if an event h occurs 
with probability ph in the environment the prior assigns it ph. That is that the probability of an event, or a probability 
distribution over an ensemble of events or continuous variable, reflects the outcome of some ideally repeatable 
experiment such as random coin tosses (Feldman 2013, 15–16). This conception of probability is at odds with the 
Bayesian account which interprets probability in terms of degrees of belief. Probability thus understood has no 
objective existence—’To frequentists, probabilities are facts, while to Bayesians they are opinions’ (16). More 
importantly, Feldman suggests, the Bayesian interpretation seems the only way in which we can accommodate 
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frequentist analysis. If frequencies are merely finite data for testing opinions, however, there is no single true prior 
and the problem of Bayesian updating is redefined as that of harmonizing behaviour to an uncertain and changing 
world—’separating agent-salient data from noise’ as Clark puts it (Clark 2015, 272).  
8 For example, space technology, nanotechnology, or the use of brain computer interfaces. 
9 Here, we can exploit an analogy with Badiou’s set-theoretical conception of Being as an inconsistent multiplicity 
or void that is ‘not-one, nor composable of ones’ (Badiou 2006, 56). However, Badiou certainly has a conception 
of thought—as evinced in his Parmenidean claim that set theory maps the structure of Being. Unbounded 
posthumanism, it appears, must relinquish such an ontological construal of the unbounded. The voided horizon 
of the posthuman cannot be pre-comprehended but it can be preempted and performed. 
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